This article proposes a new interpretation of the regional distribution of votes in the dispute for legislative offices in Brazil. The literature has traditionally understood regionalization to be evidence that politicians deliberately create zones of influences in certain areas. 
and amplifies the communication difficulties between politicians and voters. When districts have large magnitudes, both politicians and voters have difficulties coordinating and anticipating which candidates will be competitive, making the number of candidates larger than ideal. In addition, these candidates compete against one another for contact with voters. This contest is mediated by the distribution of the population throughout the territory, and therefore, by geographic relationships.
In this context, both the spatialization of the vote and the electoral race are subject to the relationships established between voters, which will in turn influence the information flow of the candidates, the dispersion of the votes, and candidates' chances of getting elected. Both dimensions reduce the candidates' control of how word of their candidacy gets spread and of how communication is established with voters. As a result, the election is subject to information flows and is conditioned geographically and socially. These relationships, which are formed outside of the electoral contest, serve as the structure within which the competition is established and parties' strategies are built. The relevance of these dimensions is conditioned by district magnitude, which is reflected by in the dispersion of votes throughout the territory.
As far as we could see, such an interpretation is new to the Brazilian case. Ames (2003) , for example, bases his study on the idea that the regionalization of votes will occur because of the direct relationship between politicians and voters that takes place through the practice of pork barrel politics 1 . In order to evaluate this new perspective, we use REGIC-IBGE data 2 (2007) as a proxy for the structure of relationships between municipalities. REGIC establishes the hierarchy between cities in accordance with the flows of people, commerce, communication, etc. These relationships compose a basic network to which every candidate and voter is subject; as a result, they influence both politicians and voters 3 , if not necessarily homogenously 4 . As a result, this article looks to make both empirical (by using new data to evaluate electoral results) and theoretical _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 1 The critique of Melo (2005) is scathing in this respect. 2 Regional Influences of Cities (REGIC -IBGE), whose initial benchmark was linked to the Division of Brazil study on functional urban regions in 1966, had the goal of understanding the relationships between municipalities through an analysis of flows of goods and services. 3 Candidates linked to a specific social segment, such as teachers or members of the military, use this set of relationships concomitantly. We use the broadest and most basic version in order to take the argument to its extreme. 4 Candidates with different resources, such as access to the media, would find it easier to go beyond these relationships and reach voters throughout the entire territory as 'puxadores de voto' (roughly translatable as 'vote-getters').
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(by applying a new explanatory framework) contributions to the study of dynamics of legislative elections in Brazil.
This article is divided into four more sections. The next section will reconstruct the traditional argument, reinforcing electoral incentives that are rarely explored and showing the importance of the composition of networks for conditioning the vote. Next, a methodological section introduces a strategy for identifying these areas, which is followed by an empirical section on evaluating elections. We then conclude with a discussion section and final considerations.
Which Institutional Incentives?
The traditional interpretation of the Brazilian political system understands its incentives for political behavior as stemming from electoral rules, circling back to the 1988 Constitution 5 . Referring to these rules, it argues that the latitude for politicians to
act stems from open-list PR and increases intra-party competition, creating incentives for politicians to engage in individualist behavior, which consequently weakens parties (CAREY and SHUGART, 1995; SAMUELS, 2002) . The implications of this argument would be seen in Congressmen behaving in undisciplined ways, chasing the personal vote, and focusing on localist strategies to the detriment of national discussions, which reduces parties to 'patronage machines' (SAMUELS, 2002) . This argument is based off of the concept of the electoral connection (MAYHEW, 1974) , which is mobilized by Ames (1995a Ames ( , 1995b Ames ( , 2003 to identify, within these incentives, the possibility that politicians' strategic actions will be reflected in the spatial dimension of the vote.
Alternatively, Latner and McGann (2005) single out other institutional characteristics in order to explain spatial voting patterns. They show that geographical representation is a component of the PR system, and that parties' strategies stem from that. Voters vote for candidates who are geographically proximate or are similar in terms of class, race, or gender, and are able to combine these characteristics (LATNER and McGANN, 2005, p. 710 Even without formal incentives for regionalization, the high magnitude, combined with proportionality, balances the list regionally. Furthermore, Cox (1990 Cox ( , 1997 and Cox and Shugart (1996) point out that, as opposed to majoritarian systems, PR systems encourage the pursuit of small groups of voters. As a result, it becomes possible to see different strategies, whether from parties or from candidates, and regionalization becomes viable for both.
This discussion touches on the Brazilian case because electoral districts are broad in terms of both geography and magnitude; as a result, this tendency to regionalize applies: a sub-districtization occurs inside every state (LATNER and McCGANN, 2005) . This can be seen in parties' strategies for forming lists of candidates, as shown in declarations by party leaders themselves (CARNEIRO, 2009; RIBEIRO, 2013 ) and by the fact that different parties have distinct electoral strategies (BRAGA, 2008; BRAGA and AMARAL, 2013; BRAGA, VEIGA and MIRÍADE, 2009; CHEIBUB and SIN, 2015) . Parties react differently to the same incentives due to their party organizations (GUARNIERI, 2011) , which are reflected in patterns of regionalized voting.
In other words, the regionalization of votes becomes a potential component of parties'
and candidates' strategies because it is a natural consequence of the magnitude and size of the electoral districts, without implying a certain type of relationship between politicians and voters.
In this sense, the vote is the result of a process that is geographically conditioned along multiple dimensions (AGNEW, 1987) . In open-list PR systems with high district magnitudes, legislative elections are subject to both general and local dynamics. A candidate would not be free of the influence of the ideological positioning of her party, for instance, but would also be subject to the sub-district context of the electoral race, which includes multiple links (not necessarily clientelist ones) established with the electorate. As a result, apart from individual categories of voters and politicians, this framework brings together interactive processes in other locations on a more structural plane of ontological explanation. In order to do this, it uses the concept of context, defined as "the geographical scope of specific influences" (AGNEW, 1996, p. 130) . According to Agnew (1996) , context mediates the political arena as a whole. In this sense, the process of forming constituencies does not come about solely due to serving the population (in order to strengthen the relationship between representatives and voters); it is a consequence of the structure produced by space. This structure is "the micro-geography of everyday life (work, residence, school, leisure, and so on)" (AGNEW, 1996, p. 133) Territory as a political arena has already been explored in political science.
Recent research about vote choice points out the importance of the location of politicians and how it is a factor in electoral success (GORECKI and MARSH, 2012; JANKOWSKI, 2016) . The birthplace of candidates and their local experience are shortcuts (see MARSH, 1987 ) that endow voters with basic information for deciding their votes. In Brazil, Terron (2009) refers to the 'geographical dimension of politics' 6 , saying that "political, economic, and social conditioning factors interact on various geographical scales and can determine significant differences in electoral behavior" (TERRON, 2009, p. 12) . There is a relationship between voters' political preferences and social contexts. This idea originates with Key (1949) , who shows that American voters' decisions are based on the 'neighborhood effect', by which one's vote is affected by the place of origin or residence of a candidate. As a result, voters have preferences for regional candidates 7 , to the detriment of others, which is justified by the calculation of promoting local interests, even if they are not organized for the defense of the common interest (KEY, 1949, p. 37) . Voters, therefore, do not choose whom to vote for independent of the environment in which they live; this is responsible, via localism, for _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 6 It is worth citing Lois (2015) as a recent effort to look at conceptions of place in political dynamics. 7 Rodden (2010) argues that voters from one party tend to reside in nearby areas, which would explain the formation of vote clusters for both presidential and congressional elections in the U.S. However, one should note that this occurs in cases in which voters have party identification. This is a characteristic that is absent in the Brazilian political system (PAIVA and TAROUCO, 2011) . As a result, this would not be a plausible hypotheses for the spatial distribution of votes in Brazil.
providing the core that gives votes to local candidates or candidates from neighboring cities (KEY, 1949, p. 132) .
As a consequence, a candidate depends on the neighborhood effect to firm up her electoral base (TERRON, 2009, p. 30) . For the voter, her vote choice is influenced by the context that is most proximate to her everyday life, involving information exchange and relationships with neighboring cities. This process of exchange is influenced by access to the local radio and television networks that cover her residence, by the sale of newspapers, and by the use of transportation between cities. This last factor, in turn, facilitates access to nearby cities' trade and commutes to work, school, etc., because "the biased information flows are likely to be spatially concentrated" (PATTIE and JOHNSTON, 2000, p. 42) .
As a result, the incorporation of geographical and socioeconomic dimensions reveals processes that would have remained invisible, yet still contribute to estimating effects on the determinants of one's vote. It is worth reinforcing the idea that "voting is about information" (LAU and REDLAWSK, 2006, p. 17) , and that this is not isolated from the social world. It is layered on top of the social world and flows through it toward certain places instead of others. What is relevant is how information about politicians reaches voters for them to decide whom to vote for, thereby explaining patterns of vote dispersion.
By incorporating context and location, we argue that politicians and voters are influenced, for instance, by the space of daily transit, information sources, and the cities that they visit during the campaign and at the moment in which votes are decided. This geographical dimension behaves differently depending on the electoral rules. The magnitude of electoral districts is key because, when added to the population distributions of electoral districts, it influences the possible strategies of parties and candidates. This is because more votes will be determined spatially when there are more seats up for grabs and when the electoral district is larger. This effect can be understood as a consequence of the increase of the cost of campaigns which tend to increase in conjunction with the size of the electorate and the territory. As a result, it becomes more likely that votes will become more concentrated.
Two dimensions, according to this perspective, are relevant: one is institutional and the other is geographical and social, given that both interact with the dispersion of votes through the territory. These elements of electoral geography contribute to analyses about electoral competition, as well as those about the relationship that has been established between congressmen and the electorate. They show how electoral territories are formed and examine the electoral connections that are formed between politicians and their electoral bases. They also supply information that is relevant to campaign strategies and for citizens to monitor representatives from their territory (TERRON, 2012, p. 17) . As a result, understanding the underlying socioeconomic dimension becomes important for forming areas in which votes are concentrated.
To sum up, from a strategic point of view, parties will tend to consider the regional characteristics of the district when forming lists of candidates, as well as choose candidates with distinct profiles who activate networks of voters that are segmented in various ways. Candidates are associated with the internal space of the district. The most basic networks, in turn, are those that are formed by different levels of socioeconomic relationships established between voters, which alters the flow of information in the territory. These will be the empirical elements to be investigated in this article.
Methodological discussion
Considering the argument that we have developed, we divided our methodological strategy into two parts. The first identifies the sub-regions into which the electoral district in question is divided. We understand that broad electoral districts are composed of areas that are formed by internal socioeconomic dynamics. Since these areas do not depend on electoral campaigns, identifying them requires information that is exogenous to the political arena. As a result, we use the Regic (Regional Influence of
Cities) database from IBGE (2007) (the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics).
The case that we evaluate is the state of São Paulo, which has a very high district magnitude, with 70 seats in play. This is the highest magnitude in Brazil, so we expect that information will flow in certain ways, causing regionalization. Since it is an extreme case, these incentives, if they exist, should be found here. Next, we test our explanation for the regional dispersion of votes in these areas for candidates for Federal Deputy in order to evaluate the relationship between district sub-areas and vote dispersion.
The first step was to organize Regic in order to identify the areas of influence within each city. The goal of Regic is to capture the link between cities by their commercial relations and flows of people, for instance, as well as to delineate networks of relationships in a hierarchical manner. This hierarchization considers the importance Glauco Peres da Silva & Graziele Silotto (2018) 12 (2) e0006 -9/34 of bigger cities for smaller ones whose inhabitants depend socioeconomically on those larger cities 8 . Each region was created by starting with a central city at a higher hierarchical level. Next, the evaluation goes to put together indicators that capture the spatial dimension of candidates' votes and comparisons with areas of influence.
To do this, we use the work of Avelino et al. (2011) The first case shows perfect coordination: it divides the territory into contiguous areas, without overlap, so that each candidate would restrict the potential _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 8 IBGE orders cities on 05 levels that are then subdivided. These orderings are established on the basis of self-sufficiency in the supply of goods, services, and public equipment for their inhabitants. Brazilian municipalities are divided into 11 categories, with lower numbers signifying more importance for the cities that are below them hierarchically.
9 QL is adapted for use in this paper as follows: = ⁄ ⁄ , with being the total of votes for candidate i in city c, = ∑ , = ∑ e = ∑ ∑ .
10 HC would be equal to − * . When QL equals 01, one would obtain * = , which could be rewritten as = ( − 1).
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(2018) 12 (2) e0006 -10/34 effect of the others. This extreme case is not expected, as much because of the difficulty of establishing sufficient coordination as for the fact that politicians' localities of reference are personal attributes that are important for the vote (SHUGART et al., 2005) .
Given that the locality is the same for all three candidates, the candidates should therefore have high numbers of votes in the same city. In the second case, the intersection of the three circles would be in this city of reference, but each candidate would seek to reach the electorate in different areas. Each one of them would make an effort to gather votes in different nearby regions. This would result in some overlap, but also some exclusive areas. In the third case, the city of reference would have little importance and there would be no type of coordination between the candidates. How, then, would the votes in fact be distributed? 
(2018) 12 (2) e0006 -16/34
As a result, determining a politician's city of reference and region is a fundamental step for determining whether this argument makes sense. The literature usually uses surveys in which politicians certify the geographical location to which they 'belong' or represent (which neighborhood, city, or region they come from or represent) (cf. GÓRECKI and MARSH, 2012) or the candidate declares her 'city of reference' (JANKOWSKI, 2016) . Here, we used candidates' local political history to determine their locality (candidates who ran for mayor or city council) and their place of affiliation. We looked at 4,267 candidates -those for whom it was possible to attribute a city of reference -out of a total of 5,320. The following section interweaves this information to test the relevance of these localities for determining the dispersion of votes.
Empirical analysis
The first result of interest is the distribution of candidates among regions in the state. Table 01 presents this information. With this in mind, we can now evaluate our results for the spatial concentration of votes. The first results, using the mean HC per candidate in each region, are below in Table 02 . Looking at the results for each region also shows us another important piece of information. The fact that the political careers of two normal individuals were built in different cities, but within the same region, suggests similar regional voting patterns. Put another way, taking two normal politicians from the same region, one could expect that their distribution of votes to be similar, even if their careers had been built in different cities. The votes for each individual should be located in regions under the influence of the same center city. As a result, we can focus on one particular region to evaluate the _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 15 Associating regions with candidates was done in two ways: by the city in which the politician ran for the offices of mayor or city council and by the place on the candidate's voting registration. These two variables were combined to make a third, more general, one, which is used from here on out: it defines the area of a candidate when both areas are the same or when only one of them is available. In cases of disagreement, we left it blank. The table presents three columns. In the first, we look at the means for candidates whose careers are associated with the city of Bauru. In the second, we show the candidates whose career is associated with a city in the same region, but not the center city. In the last column, we show the result for all candidates from the region. The main result is that the values observed in all the columns show exactly the same pattern: they are higher in their own region, which is the only one in which the means observed are positive and statistically different from 0. In addition, the correlation between the mean HCs in the two first columns is 0.996. This reinforces the argument that, regardless of the cities of origin of the candidates, the patterns of vote dispersion are similar.
These data support the argument that candidates receive an especially large number of votes in their city of reference, which backs up the findings from the literature. They also, however, accentuate the fact that votes flow from the center city to certain municipalities within the state; the only observations that do not have that sort of relation are in the regions of Campinas and Araraquara. Candidates from the center (2018) 12 (2) e0006 -22/34 city have positive means in Campinas, even though they are statistically equal to 0, whereas candidates from other cities have negative means in the region. The exact opposite happens in Araraquara. Even so, our interpretation remains that the interregional dispersion pattern is similar. To evaluate if this result can be observed for the group of regions simultaneously, we then estimated a model with control variables.
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The model used the standardized difference in HC means between candidate 'i' in region 'r' in year 'a' and the overall mean HC for all candidates in the same year in the same region as the dependent variable. We call this variable 'Z', and it equals the following expression: throughout the entire state. This finding is in agreement with those of Avelino et al. (2011) . Even if the degree of vote concentration at the regional level is larger than that at the municipal level, it does not reach the state as a whole.
Graph 02. Estimation of probability density function for z-variable by year Source: TSE.
The question then is if knowledge of the area of reference of a candidate alters the value of 'Z'. The theoretical expectation is that it would because a candidate would obtain more votes than other candidates in her regions of origin. To evaluate this relationship, we calculated the relationship of 'Z' with the following explanatory variables:
01. A dummy that indicates the region of reference for each candidate. This is the most relevant explanatory variable because we expect that, for the area of origin of a candidate, the difference between the votes obtained by her and the mean of the other candidates will be positive.
02. The 'G' index for the evaluation of the general level of dispersion of votes throughout the state. The more disperse votes are (which would imply lower values of 'G'), the lower the 'Z' value will be.
03. The total votes won by the candidate in each region per election. We expect
(2018) 12 (2) e0006 -24/34 that the higher the number of votes is on average, while controlling for their dispersion, the greater the value of 'Z' will be.
04. Finally, the population of each region 16 . We expect that, in regions with larger populations, the value of 'Z' will be greater because the candidate will be able to reach a larger number of voters in a smaller geographical space without canvassing in other areas of the state.
The data refer to all the candidates whose candidacies were accepted by the TSE. Table 04 presents the estimated results.
The first regression shows our results for the model, considering only the main explanatory variable, which is the dummy for the candidate's region of origin. Its value is high, indicating that information about geographical area is an influential factor on the number of votes received. For the second regression, we also included the 'G' index, calculating it at the regional level 17 . The value of the estimated parameter for the 'G' variable has a negative sign, as expected, and is significant for all the models we estimated. The estimate beta value was around -1.6, suggesting that the votes are concentrated in the regions we indicated. In the third regression, we included a dummy variable indicating if the candidate was elected. The value of the estimated parameter for this variable is positive, suggesting that candidates who are elected have, on average, larger differences in votes throughout the state. With the inclusion of the other control variables in the other models, the value of the estimated parameters does not change significantly.
It is important to note the interaction parameter between the regional and elected dummy variables that is introduced in the model. This interaction aims to evaluate the pattern of voting behavior for elected candidates within their home regions.
The sign of the parameter that is estimated for this variable is always negative. This means that the deputies elected by São Paulo have a mean value of 'Z' in their home regions that is smaller than that of other candidates.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 16 To put together the population variable for electoral years, we made the following matches: for the 1998 election, we used the population count of 1996; for the 2002 election, we used the 2000 census; for the 2006 election, we used the 2007 count; for the 2010 election, we used the 2010 census; and for the 2014 election, we used the population projections for that year. 17 We tested the G variables, calculated at both the municipal and regional levels, on the models. The results did not change. We tried the regional option because of the results obtained in Avelino et al. (2011) . As the graph shows, the values of the parameters are, on average, below those observed previously. While the previous parameter had a mean close to 04, the case in question has a mean below 01. This implies that the difference in votes between a given candidate and the mean for other candidates in the region of reference is greater than the difference in neighboring regions. Furthermore, in this case, the differences between center cities and other cities are not particularly accentuated. With the exception of the São Paulo metropolitan region, the difference between the groups in other cases are within the confidence intervals. These results reinforce the argument that regional dynamics seem more important for the spatialization of the vote.
Discussion
The conventional explanation for the regionalization of the vote in Brazil is distributivist: deputies win over voters by providing pork, and voters reciprocate with their votes. Informal districts (AMES, 1995b (AMES, , 2003 CARVALHO, 2003; PEREIRA and MUELLER, 2003; SAMUELS, 2002; etc) . According to the conventional wisdom, districtization was intentional.
The regionalization of the vote, however, does not seem to be sufficient empirical evidence to confirm this traditional approach. On the contrary, regionalization tends to take place as a strategy on the part of political parties to put together electoral lists. It can also be an effect of the informational dynamic across the territoryinformation flows -that would facilitate credit claiming, for example, or even through the different socializations to which voters are subject. In other words, the intentionality of politicians lies more in how they deal with the geographical influence on information flows than in creating informal districts. Personal relations seem to impose a layer with new dynamics that explain the observed dispersion of votes, starting with the transmission of biased information that makes its way to the electorate. Even though the relation that is established between politician and voters is clientelist, this is not sufficient to account for the spatialization of the vote.
In the approach that we propose, we understand that politicians need to deal with this division of the territory to have success, in accordance with the resources they have at hand. Some can project their influence throughout the entire district, like journalists; others are known only in their cities, and these make the regional dynamic more relevant. The regions examined here suggest that there is an external dimension to politics that interacts with formal electoral institutions and affects the behavior of politicians. Looking only at parliamentary behavior does not seem to be sufficient to explain electoral results. This argument makes it more difficult to use the electoral connection as a central (or the only) factor for analyzing the Brazilian case because it assumes that only a few institutional dimensions are enough to explain the case.
Elections would be evaluated by their ability to explain congressmen's actions, and not through the set of incentives that explain the result per se.
In line with the distributivist perspective, we argue that this districtization occurs. Even so, while the mechanism in that explanation lies in the use of pork barrel politics, we argue here that it is the result of the electoral system, in conjunction with the dynamics of space -territory and the relations engendered by it and within it. The theoretical construction of this mechanism is in accordance with common empirical observations made in the national political dynamic, notably in electoral politics.
Candidates and news about legislative candidacies make reference to sub-regions of districts. The number of news reports in which the relationship between candidates and specific regions is vast 19 , which entails an argument employed to convince the voter that a given region needs to elect its own representative.
Final considerations
The data indicate the existence of a regional pattern of votes in São Paulo that respects the existence of previous relationships between voters. The scattering of votes through the territory seems subject to a previously established dynamic that affects the result of the election. Context matters for explaining this dispersion.
These statements open up space for an investigation about the Brazilian electoral system that has been ignored up to now. The theoretical construction that underlies it has reached an extreme level of focus on the incentives emanating from some elements, while overlooking others. Understanding the incentives does not imply arguing that all individuals subject to them behave in the same way. One should observe that the application of the socioeconomic layer that we propose here might not be the only possible layer; it is simply the most basic layer (supposedly) that affects us all.
Some have mechanisms to overcome it, such as the 'puxadores de voto', while others make use of other connections to reach the electorate. The tendency of information flows is the common component in these network mobilization strategies, and it deserves deeper investigation.
As a result, the introduction of this approach from political geography seems promising. In this first foray, one can note that the knowledge of the region of an individual's political history, in conjunction with the hierarchy of municipalities, supplies sufficient information for one to understand the dispersion of votes within a territory. A politician's performance within this region, for example, combined with mayors and state deputies, should provide clues about the electoral dynamics for _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 19 Examples of politicians' preoccupation with the regional aspect of the state in the dispute for Federal Deputy in São Paulo for the 2014 elections: http://www.jj.com.br/noticias-6715-bigardi-comenta-a-importancia-eleger-representantes-da-regiao-; http://portalprudentino.com.br/noticia/noticias.php?id=38514&titulo=bragato-e-ed-sao-osunicos-deputados-eleitos-de-pp; http://www.atribuna.com.br/elei%C3%A7%C3%B5es-2014/baixada-santista-elege-seis-deputados-para-s%C3%A3o-paulo-e-bras%C3%ADlia-1.407846; http://www.revide.com.br/gerais/ribeirao-elege-tres-estaduais-e-dois-federais/; among others. Other examples were the declarations of votes by deputies in the session that approved the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff. A considerable number of deputies cited some region of their state of origin.
legislative offices in Brazil. Furthermore, the internal dynamics of the other electoral districts should lead to different results, because not only the contexts vary, but also the magnitudes of the electoral districts that affect the importance of regionalization. Apart from this aspect, one could consider putting together experiments in which one could evaluate the effect of a politician moving to a different region between elections on the dispersion of her vote, as well as the perception that voters would have of this politician.
Other studies must go on, looking at the theoretical ramifications of this approach and considering that the voter wants to correctly choose her candidate given the alternatives presented to her (LAU and REDLAWSK, 2006) , but faces high costs for obtaining precise information and processing it. By doing so, we will be able to make progress in understanding PR elections in Brazil.
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